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BOOK REVIEWS
W.J.M. Levelt and G.B. Flores d'Arcais, eds., Studies in the perception of
language. Chichester, Sussex: Wiley, 1978.
W hat constitutes comprehension? Suppose A remarks to B, in a sneering 
manner, “ He turned out to be a real friend” . Unless B recognises that “ he” is 
m eant to refer to a specific individual C, and that the real import of A ’s 
com m ent is pretty much the opposite of its literal meaning, B can hardly be 
said to have understood what A said in the sense in which we usually use the 
term. If B showed a failure to apprehend either of these aspects of the 
utterance, for instance, A could rightly say “ No, you d o n ’t understand  m e” , 
and  elaborate upon the original utterance.
Comprehension, as the term is commonly com prehended, thus embraces a 
certain am ount more than merely processing the literal meaning of a sentence
-  at least some com ponents  of it will routinely require reference to the 
discourse context. Yet by far the majority of experimental psycholinguistic 
studies of language comprehension have investigated the processing of isolated 
sentences in the absence of context.
This book is entirely concerned with the com prehension of language, and it 
is a pleasant surprise to find that it does not ignore the question of whether the 
vast majority of com prehension studies have in fact been inappropriately  
designed. Moreover, the collection provides an unusually broad sampling of 
the kind of research on language unders tanding  currently in progress in 
psycholinguistics, from studies of syntactic and lexical processing during the 
com prehension of isolated sentences through studies of sentence com prehen­
sion in context to an AI parsing model (of an idiosyncratic type, it is true, but 
one which specifically lays claim to psychological reality).
Levelt and d ’Arcais originated the book in a special seminar on sentence 
com prehension at the In ternational Congress of Psychology in the summer of 
1976. The inevitable publication lag has meant that several chapters have been 
overtaken by later research in some respects. In a sense the contribution  to 
suffer most from this problem must be Levelt’s own chapter, a survey of 
sentence perception studies from 1970 to 1976; but in fact this remains an 
outstandingly  useful paper. H undreds  of papers are included in the survey, and 
the cross-classification under multiple headings (measurement techniques em ­
ployed versus variables investigated, for instance) makes it easy to use the 
paper  for a num ber of different purposes. Moreover, it turns out to be even
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better than it looks at first glance. For  instance, our current knowledge of the 
processing of lexical ambiguity suggests that all readings of an ambiguous 
word are momentarily  activated when the word is heard, irrespective of context 
(Swinney 1979), but that this multiple activation does not cause a general 
processing decrement (Mehler et al. 1978; N ew m an and Dell 1978). Levelt, 
writing before these latest findings were published, reached the same conclu­
sion. So although the review is no longer quite up to date, and the issues with 
which it deals are no longer the currently most debated  questions -  for 
instance, the current opposition between serial m odular  versus interactive 
models had not been delineated by 1976 -  it is as good an account of that 
period of comprehension research as one could wish, and should be put into 
the hands of all beginning graduate  students in psycholinguistics -  it could 
save them a lot of work.
Most of the remaining chapters report original experimental work. 
N ooteboom , discussing the use of prosodic cues in the unders tanding  of 
language, informs us that if we are forced to listen to two speakers s im ulta­
neously, only very slight differences in pitch will enable us to distinguish 
between the two voices; and that perception of a phonem e segment can be 
delayed until information contained in the following segments allows us to 
determine whether the segment in question was short or long. Wright and 
Wilcox report a series of inter-connected experiments designed to isolate and 
investigate independently  the subcom ponents  of the task of reading and 
carrying out simple instructions. They were able to discover, for instance, that 
when two or three instructions following one another had the same surface 
form, the later ones became easier to process (though no easier to perform), a 
finding which could be of im portance to the compilers of cookery books, 
do-it-yourself manuals and the like.
Three of the chapters, those of d ’Arcais, Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Seiden- 
berg, and Carroll, Tanenhaus and Bever, deal with more theoretical issues in 
sentence processing. The first argues that the clause is an im portan t unit of 
syntactic processing and that, o ther things being equal, main clauses are easier 
to process than subordinate  clauses. The second, constructing something of a 
straw man and smashing it decisively down, argues that the im portance of the 
clause as a syntactic unit does not therefore imply that semantic inform ation 
contained in the clause must await processing until the syntactic unit as a 
whole has been isolated. The third concentrates on the propositional structure 
of utterances and how cues to what the authors call “ functionally com plete” 
units enable the hearer to identify potential propositional units.
A chapter by Pynte forms one more contribution  to the extensive psycholin- 
guistic literature on ambiguity (see Levelt’s review for an indication of how 
impressively large this literature had become by 1976). Pynte’s contribution  is 
noteworthy because it reports studies carried out in French using sentences 
such as “ le nouveau garde la po r te” , in which all words beyond the first are
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ambiguous. Such sentences in English (“ the tall can h it” ) are much less 
satisfactory because English lacks the useful function word ambiguities of 
French. Disappointingly, Pynte’s experiments failed to reach an unam biguous 
conclusion, but his a t tem pt is an object lesson in what should happen more 
often in psycholinguistics. Too much psycholinguistic research has concerned 
itself exclusively with English, and has sometimes come up against insuperable 
confounds resulting from the structure of the language. In many cases these 
confounds could be avoided by conducting the experiments in another lan­
guage. (See, for instance, Frauenfelder et al. 1980, on relative clause processing, 
exploiting the possibility to vary subject versus object relatives while holding 
word order constant that is available in French but not in English.) Early 
experimental psycholinguistic work often involved cross-linguistic observations 
exploiting the differences to be found between languages (e.g. Forster 1966), 
but such work somehow fell into disuse (so that of the more than 200 studies 
referred to in Levelt’s survey, only five deal with languages other than English, 
and  none of these make cross-linguistic comparisons). It is to be hoped that the 
recent revival of interest in striking capital out of differences between lan­
guages (e.g. Lukatela et al. 1980) will continue.
The one Al chapter  in the book is an account by Riesbeck and Schank of a 
parsing system which forms part of the larger language processing system 
developed by Schank and his co-workers. It is clearly written, with the 
psychologist in mind, and contains well worked out examples of how the 
parser operates. The authors go out on a limb at the end of their paper by 
making explicitly testable psychological predictions from their model (albeit of 
a very general kind). Flowever, their contribution  is unnecessarily hard to 
follow for one simple reason: the reader’s acquaintance with the semantic base 
on which the parser functions, Schank’s conceptual dependency system, is 
assumed throughout, and backed up by only brief citations to other works. 
Technical terms such as P T R A N S  are used without any definition. It seems to 
the present reviewer that it is an unw arranted  assumption for the likely 
readership of this book that they will be familiar with CD , or for that matter 
even recognise a C D  representation when they see one.
The final chapter  in the book is one by Clark which contains no new 
experiments, but argues for a particular view of comprehension, specifically, 
that outlined in the in troductory  paragraph to this review. Clark is concerned 
to take a middle line between those who would restrict comprehension to the 
literal processing of the sentence (e.g. “ he turned out to be a real friend" 
without pronom inal instantiation or com puta tion  of conveyed irony), and 
those who would include all the hearer’s knowledge which happens to be 
brought into play by A ’s use of this particular sentence (e.g. B’s acquaintance 
with the occurrence which p rom pted  A ’s remark). The existence of differing 
points  of view on this issue also concerns Levelt in his review; he comes to the 
ra ther  gloomy conclusion that some groups of psycholinguists will probably
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never agree: particularly those who customarily investigate the processing of 
isolated sentences using simultaneous measurement tasks versus those who use 
verification tasks (e.g. judging whether a sentence correctly describes a picture). 
The former will always continue to accuse the latter of not studying com pre­
hension pure and simple because verification tasks contain  other com ponents  -  
com parison and verification -  besides comprehension.
There is surely, however, a case to be m ade for all types of research. 
Certainly it is clear that comprehension as we unders tand  it in everyday use 
typically involves more than the identification of the literal meaning of a 
sentence; but it is not clear that this fact in itself necessarily invalidates studies 
of com prehension which have investigated the processing of sentences in 
isolation. In fact, C lark’s paper in the present volume indirectly provides a 
splendid argum ent in support of ju s t  the kind of research from which he wishes 
to disassociate himself. One of the examples he uses to illustrate how hearers 
draw  inferences beyond the literal meaning of the sentence in com prehension is 
the indirect request; his model of the processing of indirect requests assumes 
that the direct in terpretation of the utterance is com puted  first, and  then, if 
this does not seem adequate  in the context, further assumptions are con­
structed about the speaker’s intentions. Similarly, in the case of definite 
reference, Clark proposes that the description of the in tended referent is 
com puted  first, and if no entity conforming to this description can be located 
in memory, additional assumptions are generated. In each case the first stage 
in processing comprises com putation  of the literal meaning of the utterance. If 
com puta tion  of the literal meaning of the utterance is a necessary stage in any 
sentence com prehension operation, then, it surely makes eminent sense to 
study it in isolation. It would be wrong to say that the study of sentence 
processing in isolation will tell us all there is to be known about the process of 
comprehension; but it will give us valuable insight into a vital par t  of the 
process. The more that a complex task such as com prehension can be broken 
down into subcom ponents  which can be analysed and described indepen­
dently, the more we will eventually know about the task as a whole and the 
more useful, in terms of potential application, the knowledge will be.
A nne Cutler 
Experimental Psychology
Sussex University 
Brighton, U K
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George Lakoff and M ark Johnson, Metaphors we live by. Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1980. 242 pp. $13.95 (hardcover).
M etaphor, traditionally the dom ain  of literary and poetic theory, has recently 
a ttracted  the increasing attention of linguists, philosophers and even psycholo­
gists, who have begun to consider m etaphor an interesting testing ground for 
more general views on language, meaning and conceptualisation (see, for 
example, O rtony  1979; Sacks 1979).
A traditional approach, rooted in the classical rhetoric from Aristotle to 
Quintillian, views m etaphor essentially as a “ figure” of discourse, an ornam ent 
of expression, and therefore limits the analysis of m etaphor to poetic language. 
Yet this position has come increasingly under attack. By the eighteenth 
century, Jeremy Bentham had already observed the pervasiveness of m etaphor 
in everyday language; in our century almost all analyses of m etaphor claim
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that metaphorical processes are present in all linguistic manifestations and that 
m etaphor is essential in our conceptualisation of things (see Jespersen 1922; 
W horf  1939; Richards 1936; Langer 1942).
Even if it doesn’t explicitly mention this tradition. Metaphors we live by, by 
Lakoff and Johnson (L& J),  is rooted in it, and probably  represents the most 
radical s tatement to date. F rom  their perspective m etaphor becomes a matter 
of central concern not only in everyday language, but, first of all, in our 
conceptual system, in the very structure of our thought: “The way we think, 
what we experience, and what we do every day is very much a matter of 
m e tapho r” .
Two basic assumptions underlie the work of L & J. First, m etaphor is not a 
m atte r  of language, but of thought processes. Second, there is a homology 
between thought and language, the conceptual system and the linguistic
